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THE COMMISSIONER'S CLEAR REFLECTION OF INCOME POWER UNDER
§446(B) AND THE ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD OF REVIEW: WHERE HAS
THE RULE OF LAW GONE, AND CAN WE GET IT BACK?
by
Jennifer C. Root*
I.. INTRODUCTION
Aristotle has been credited with the beginnings of modem thought on the
rule of law with his concepts of the universal rule of law and equity.' The revered
philosopher saw the rule of law as the foundation to an orderly society.2 He states
in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics that a correctly established law promotes virtue
as well as discouraging vice.3 Aristotle also noted that due to the imperfections in
the written law, a system of equity is necessary to supplement the application of the
law to specific cases . Thus, Aristotle illustrated the legal system's need for a
balance between strict adherence to a system of written laws, and the discretionary
system of individual judgement.
Eric G. Zahnd analyzes Aristotle's concept of the balance between written
rules and discretion by stating: "But at some point, though admittedly not one that
is always clear, the introduction of equity challenges the development and
administration of an ordered system of rules, a problem of considerably greater
concern today than at the time and place in which Aristotle wrote."5 Accordingly,
Georgetown University Law LL.M. in Taxation, Class of 1999. The author would like to
thank Edward Morse, Associate Professor of Law at Creighton University School of Law,
for introducing me to the topic of this article in all its fascination and complexity.
1 Eric G. Zahnd, The Application of Universal Laws To Particular Cases: A Defense of
Equity in Aristotelianism and Anglo-American Law, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263
(1996).
21d. at 266, (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1129019-25 (Terence Irwin trans.,
1985)).
3id.
4id.
5 1d. at 277 (citing Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. Workers Compensation Appeals Bd., 202 Cal.
Rptr. 520, 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) vacated, 216 Cal. Rptr. 115 (Cal. 1985). See also
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) ("The Rule of Law is a historic ideal, and appeals to the Rule
of Law remain rhetorically powerful. Yet the precise meaning of the Rule of Law is perhaps
less clear than ever before.")
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judges are to be given the flexibility to use equity in particular cases where the use
of a universal law is inappropriate, but the use of unfettered discretion by judges
cannot be allowed.6 This constant need for balance illustrates the tension that exists
between the rule of law and the rule of man in a legal system. Therefore,
somewhere along the continuum between the rule of law (normative written law)
and the rule of man (discretion) lies the balance necessary to a legal system, and the
point of balance is subject to constant change. To err too far toward the rule of law
is to end with inflexibility and unjust results, and to err too far toward the rule of
man is to end with inconsistency and uncertainty in results.
This article will first examine the evolution of the rule of law by examining
the conceptual frameworks proposed by scholars to analyze the rule of law. The
foundations of the rule of law taken from these scholars will be condensed into
several principles applicable to modem tax law. These principles will then be used
to illustrate how both discretion and adherence to the written law are necessary in
order to promote a workable system of tax law promulgation, administration, and
interpretation. The next section of this article will examine §446 of the Internal
Revenue Code7 and the Commissioner's clear reflection of income power contained
therein. This section will illustrate the status of the clear reflection power as it is
defined in the law, the judiciary, and used by the Commissioner today.
Section four will examine the judicial review of the Commissioner's
determinations under §446 using the abuse of discretion standard. The fifth section
will determine whether the rule of law has been unjustifiably compromised with
respect to the Commissioner's clear reflection of income power. Section five will
then make arguments for and propose an alternative standard of review for the
Commissioner's clear reflection of income powers. Section six discusses the
implications for a change in the standard of review for clear reflection of income
cases and analyzes the benefits and burdens of returning power to the judicial
branch. Finally, the article will conclude with thoughts on the rule of law and how
it can be best served through the system of internal revenue under §446.
6 Zahnd, supra note 1 at 267.
7 26 U.S.C. § 446 (1994). Unless otherwise noted, all citations to code sections refer to Title
26 of the United States Code (Internal Revenue Code).
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II. THE RULE OF LAW
A. A Brief History of The Rule of Law
The rule of law is an often cited and honored concept in American
Jurisprudence.8 The first step in understanding the rule of law is to, examine the
rule of law in opposition to its contradiction the rule of man.9 On the surface, the
rule of law stands for the simple statement that laws must be fixed and known in
advance of their application to the citizens bound by such rules.1" The contrast is
the situation in which governmental officials create the law as they are applying it
to specific instances, also known as the rule of man. 1 At first glance, the rule of
law appears to always be preferable to the inherent arbitrariness of the rule of
man. 12 The assertion can even be made that respect for the rule of law is an
essential and fundamental tenet of the American legal system. 3
However, as Aristotle noted, the rule of law should not be taken to stand for
rigidity or the elimination of all discretion in a system of laws. 14 Instead, both
formal rules as well as limited discretion are necessary in order to have a workable
balanced system of laws. 5 Thus, the application of rule of law principles to any
system to determine when a system runs afoul of the rule of law will not end in a
clear-cut conclusion except in the most extreme of instances. Instead, the violation
of the rule of law will be a matter of degree where the principles of the rule of law
have been too deeply sacrificed in favor of discretion. Therefore, the principles
attributable to the rule of law must not be viewed as absolute requirements, but
instead must be viewed in the context of a delicate balance that must be carefully
cultivated and vigilently tended.
A.V. Dicey, in his treatise The Law of the Constitution,16 sets forth three
fundamental characteristics of the rule of law.'7 First, the rule of law is served
8 Richard A. Epstein, Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional Structure,
56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 149, 149 (1987).
' Fallon, supra note 5 at 2-3.
'
0 Id. at3.
11 Id.
12 See id.
13 id.
14 See id. at 3-4. See also ARISTOTLE, supra note 2.
'5 Fallon, supra note 5 at 3.
16 A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (7 th ed.
1908).
17 See Epstein, supra note 8 at 151 (citing DICEY, supra note 16).
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when there is a predominance of regular law over the discretion of individuals
within the government.'" This proposition stands for the general rule that man
should be governed by rules and not by the judgement of a single person.' 9 Thus,
arbitrariness, prerogative, and wide discretionary authority must be minimized in
order to have a legal system in conformity with the rule of law.2" Second, the rule
of law demands the equal treatment of those that come before the law. 2' This
proposition stands not only for the equal treatment of similarly situated individuals
by the law, but also stands for the proposition that all classes of citizens must be
subject to the law.22 Third, the rule of law maintains that rules are not the source
of individuals' rights but instead are the consequence of individuals' rights as
defined by the courts. 23 This proposition has been argued to stand for the principles
of granting limited power to the government, the separation of powers between the
branches of government, and a full utilization of judicial review.24 Therefore, the
rule of law is seen as a mechanism to restrain discretionary governmental action and
protect citizens from the arbitrary use of overly broad governmental power.
Unlike Dicey's constitutional and legal system oriented view on the rule of
law, Freidrich Hayek takes a more pragmatic approach. 6 Hayek takes the three
broad principles of the rule of law as articulated by Dicey and reduces them into a
singular definition. 7 This definition lends itself more readily to modern application,
and lends itself more readily to analysis of individual situations. 28 "The formal
rules tell people in advance what action the state will take in certain types of
situations, defined in general terms, without reference to time and place or
particular people. '29 Thus, Hayek, like Dicey, believes the rule of law stands for
limiting discretion in favor of formal rules providing notice to the governed, and
stands for equal treatment of citizens bound by the law as well as equal subjugation
18Id.
19 See id.
20 Id. (quoting DICEY, supra note 16 at 198).
21 Id. (quoting DICEY, supra note 16 at 198).
22 See id.
23 Epstein, supra note 8 at 151.
24 See generally, id.
25 See id. at 152. Epstein discusses how liberty and utility can be reduced by flagrant ill-
defined rules.26 Id. at 151. Citing FREIDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 74 (1944). Hayek uses
the definition to argue against socialist planning which is in opposition to the rule of law's
prohibition against discretion.
27 Epstein, supra note 8 at 151-52.
28 See id. at 151-52.
29HAYEK, supra note 26 at 74.
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of those citizens to the law. 30 However, Hayek, unlike Dicey does not use the third
requirement which is less applicable to specific instances of governmental conduct
and more applicable to the structure of the government itself.3'
Despite the apparent simplicity in the requirements of the rule of law as
seen by Hayek and Dicey, the rule of law must also perform another function.32
Thus far, the principles of the rule of law have taken on an attitude of protecting the
individual from the government and having a system of fairness in the treatment of
citizens before the law. Undoubtably, this is the focus of the rule of law's main
principles. However, the rule of law equation cannot balance without looking to the
governing as well as the governed.33 As much as the individual needs the
definiteness of a written law to protect his rights, the governmental body
administering the law needs definiteness in order to apply it.34 To those applying
the law, the rule of law requires that the rules determine the outcomes. Thus, to
fully conform to the rule of law's requirements the governing body must have prior
notice of the rules to be applied, and must ensure that the results of the application
of those rules flow from the rules themselves.36
In summary, the rule of law is a fluid concept and has been so since the time
of Aristotle. As set in opposition to the rule of man, the rule of law is articulated
as standing for clearly written rules that give notice to the governed in advance of
their application. The rule of law stands against the system wherein citizens are
subject to the discretion of an individual acting as judge. The rule of law takes on
the principle of equality of citizens before the law, and equality of treatment of
citizens by the law. The rule of law also stands for the principle that rules and
governments are given life because of the rights of individuals and not the opposite.
30 See id.
"' See id. See infra part H B 2 for a discussion of the third requirement of the rule of law.
32 Fallon, supra note 5 at 2 (citing LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 42-44 (rev. ed.
1964)) (arguing the regiment of public rules set in advance and adherence to some natural-
law values). Also note that the requirements of the rule of law as stated by Dicey and Hayek
must always be seen in light of Aristotle's balance between the rule of law and the rule of
man. Discretion cannot ever be entirely eliminated. Thus, an amount of uncertainty will
always pervade any discussion of the rule of law.
33 See id. at 3, ("Within perhaps the most familiar understanding of this distinction [rule of
law versus rule of man], the law-and its meaning-must be fixed and publicly known in
advance of application, so that those applying the law, as much as those to whom it is
applied, can be bound by it.").
14 See id.
" See id. at 3-4.
36 See id. at 3.
5
Root: The Commissioner's Clear Reflection of Income Power
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
Analysis of the rule of law must be performed not only from the individual
perspective but also from the governing body's perspective - for only through both
sides can the principles of the rule of law ultimately be achieved. Finally,
Aristotle's continuum must be kept in mind as the benchmark of discretion for no
system can function without it - and with too much, no system can function with
it.
B. The Rule of Law As It Applies in the Realm of Tax Law
1. The Expanding Roles of Administrative Agencies
In 1913 the first modem tax law was enacted pursuant to Congress'
constitutional authority to lay and collect taxes. 37 This early Code was only sixteen
pages and by our standards today is considered to have been relatively simple in its
conception. 38 The provisions were written in broad and general terms rather than
the detailed rules that are common under the modem Code.39 At the time the
original Code was placed into practice, the courts were relied upon to create
principles in order to deal with the problems that developed based on the
indefiniteness of the statutory language. Therefore, the Internal Revenue Code's
fledgling years were marked with simplicity, broad language, and a heavy
dependence upon the judiciary for interpretation.4 1
Since the time of the original enactment, the Code itself as well as the
system of enforcement of the Code has changed radically.4 2 First, the tax law has
changed from a brief set of broadly worded statutes to volumes of specific detailed
rules. 3 The complexity of the individual rules has increased simultaneously with
3' The Income Tax Law of 1913, Pub. L. No. 16, 38 Stat. 114, § 2 (1913). James W.
Colliton, Standard, Rules and the Decline of the Courts in the Law of Taxation, 99 DICK.
L. REv. 265, 266 (1994); U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
38 Colliton, supra note 37 at 265.
39 Id. at 265-66.
40 Id. at 266.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 265-69. See also Richard M. Lipton, We Have Met The Enemy and He is Us: More
Thoughts on Hyperlexis, 47 TAx LAW. 1, 1 (1993).
43 Colliton, supra note 37 at 265. See also Lipton, supra note 42 at 1 (arguing that the
increase in the volumes and sources of the tax code are generally spurned on by the
"incessant clamoring of tax professionals for more guidance on virtually every issue that
they encounter."). Note, the Internal Revenue Code encompasses 3052 pages of the United
States Code of 1994.
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the elimination of broad standards.' The modem trend has been toward legislating
rules that cover a long list of conceivable contingencies, which accounts for the
increase in length in the Code and regulations.45 Some scholars even argue that
there is no incentive to refrain from this extreme elaboration present in tax
legislation.a6 Richard M. Lipton summarizes the state of the modem Code and
accompanying regulations as "particularized, elaborated and microscopic in
character, '4 1 which is the polar opposite of the original sixteen page enactment.
The second and most profound change has been among the roles of the
three branches in tax promulgation, administration, and adjudication." No longer
does the legislative branch rely on the judicial branch to create principles to deal
with problems that arise.49 Instead the Congress simply amends the rules in order
to deal with the problems themselves. 50 The role of the courts as a major mode of
tax law development has been phased out. 5' Thus, the branches have experienced
a major power shift away from the courts and back to Congress.52 Congress has
also increasingly been delegating more power to the Treasury to develop and
promulgate the rules associated with the statutes that are enacted.53 Therefore, the
modem Code has grown in volume, detail, and complexity and its interpretation has
changed from the hands of the courts to the hands of the executive branch.
The executive branch has been saddled with a large burden of rule
development due to legislative delegation. 54 The general expansion and complexity
of governmental regulation has caused the legislature to rely on outside expertise
44 Colliton, supra note 37 at 265-66.
4' Lipton, supra note 42 at 2-4.
46Id. at 2.
47 Id. at 3.
48 Colliton, supra note 37 at 266.49 Id. at 266-67. See generally Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest:
A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA.
L. REv. 1 (1990).
50 Colliton, supra note 37 at 266.
"1 Id.at 268-69.
52 id.
13 Lipton, supra note 42 at 1, (citing Gordon D. Henderson, Controlling Hyperlexis - The
Most Important "Law and .... " 43 Tax Law. 177 (1989)). See also Bayless Manning,
Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REv. 767 (1977); Peter H. Aranson et al.,
A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982).
14 Fallon, supra note 5 at 3-4. See also Aranson, supra note 53.
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in many areas of the law in which the legislature cannot itself be expert.55
Congress' resource limitations make it difficult to efficiently and effectively
legislate meaningful rules.56 For these reasons, administrative agencies have been
relied upon to take on a large amount of the responsibility for governmental
regulation. 7 The administrative agencies are many times saddled with vague
mandates from the legislature and are asked to perform duties that are a
combination of rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication. Thus, administrative
agencies have become an essential part of the complex modem legal environment59
and in no other particular area of law is this more true than in the area of taxation.
2. Separation of Powers
The third requirement of the rule of law as set out by Dicey is the somewhat
amorphous governmental structure concept that has been interpreted differently by
different scholars.6° In the context of our discussion of administrative agencies,
several schools of thought are applicable. First, many scholars interpret the rule of
law from a constitutional standpoint, 61 and argue that the rule of law stands for the
strict separation of powers between the branches of government.62 This school of
thought, of which Justice Scalia counts himself, holds that the sharing of powers
between the branches is absolutely prohibited by the Constitution.63 Similarly,
Justice Scalia also holds that the rule of law should be upheld through the use of
clear legal rules, and that discretion is dangerous because it allows the individual
55 Peter Marra, Have Administrative Agencies Abandoned Reasonability?, 6 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 763, 767, 770 (1996).
56 Id. at 767-68, 772-775.
17 Id. at 767. But see Colliton, supra note 37 at 272-73.
58 Fallon, supra note 5, at 3-4.. See also Marra, supra note 55, at 769.
'9 See Marra, supra note 55 at 765-66, 777.
60 DICEY, supra note 16. See also Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law
and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 307 (1989).
61 Verkuil, supra note 60 at 307: ("Separation of powers is not mentioned in the
Constitution, nor, for that matter, is the rule of law. The concern with separation of powers
derives from the structure of the Constitution (which establishes three branches in articles
I, II and III) and from contemporaneous political tracts like The Federalist.").62 Id. See also Marra, supra note 55 at 781-82; George Anhang, Separation of Powers and
the Rule of Law: On the Role of Judicial Restraint in "Securing the Blessings of Liberty,"
24 AKRON L. REV. 211 (1990). (arguing that the two sides to separation of powers
arguments are the "ex ante" and "ex post." Ex ante argues for strict separation of powers
while ex post justifies a certain degree of interrelationship).
63 Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 991, 1013-14 (1994). See also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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making judgments to impose "value judgments instead of being forced to adhere to
prior governing principles." 64 Thus, when analyzing separation of powers problems,
the strict separationists adopt a very rule-like approach to Dicey' s third requirement
of the rule of law.65
The second set of legal scholars interpret the rule of law from the
standpoint that complete separation of powers is a practical impossibility, and
instead the system of checks and balances is necessary in order to fulfill the ideals
of the rule of law as much as possible.66 This school of thought holds that the
framers of the Constitution were concerned that if they concentrated more than one
of the legislative, executive, or judicial powers in one department of government,
they would sacrifice liberty.67 However, they also acknowledge that the framers did
not create barriers to the interaction of the branches within the Constitution.68 Thus,
the true working of the government should be through the system of checks and
balances which prevents any one branch from overpowering another. 69  The
Supreme Court generally has followed this school of thought in most of its
decisions, and has allowed Congress to delegate lawmaking tasks to administrative
agencies.70
The checks and balances approach to separation of powers is arguably the
most practical legal framework when analyzing the true workings of the
government, but as with any balancing analysis a large degree of vagueness is
inherent. 7' Despite the fact that this school of thought holds that an intermingling
of powers is justified, it agrees that an unconstitutional exercise of federal powers
is possible and will result in a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.72 As
64 Segall, supra note 63 at 1000.
65 Id. at 1013.
66 See Marra, supra note 55 at 782-83. (arguing that this approach is known as the
"interaction" approach to separation of powers principles, and may be seen as a more
practical view).
67 Id. at 779.
68 Id. at 780.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 785-86.
71 See Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive
Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 430, 440 (1987). Sargentich further breaks
down the checks and balances position into two classifications known as the extreme and
moderate positions. For the purposes of this article the moderate approach as illustrated by
Sargentich will be considered the checks and balances approach.72 M. Isabel Medina, Judicial Review -A Nice Thing? Article III, Separation of Powers and
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 29 CoNN. L. REv.
9
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James Madison stated: "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny."73
However, James Madison did not seek to describe the circumstances in
which a violation of the separation of powers takes place, and he did not address
such violations in the context of administrative agencies in particular.74 In fact,
constitutional scholars such as Thomas 0. Sargentich, question the vagueness of the
checks and balances approach:
It seems insufficient to respond that one
simply must judge whether some result would
involve 'undue' or 'excessive' infringement on
certain of the values at stake in the system of
checks and balances. It may be, for example, that
as long as there is not 'too much' intrusion on the
role of agencies, the aims of legislative oversight,
or other competing interests, centralized executive
supervision is acceptable. But such a
generalization begs the key questions: how much
is too much, and by what measures are such things
to be determined?75
Therefore, the checks and balances school of thought leaves many
unanswered questions when it applies its balancing tests to separation of powers
issues.76
Probably one of the most important aspects of the checks and balances
school of thought is the concept of judicial review because it lends standards to the
balancing which must take place when analyzing separation of powers issues.77
Noting the importance of judicial review to the rule of law, Justice Brandeis states:
"The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have some court
1525, 1546-47 (1997) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed.,
1987).
7' THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 72 at 245-46.
74 Medina, supra note 72 at 1547.
71 Sargentich, supra note 71 at 440-41.
76 See id. at 441.
77 See Medina, supra note 72 at 1554-56.
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decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied and whether the proceeding
in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly. 78
Judicial review has been compared to the due process clause in that it "is
viewed by both litigants and the courts as the greater source of constitutional
protection for the individual litigant from exercises of powers by the sovereign
through administrative agencies.' '7 Judicial intervention and resolution of disputes
is a necessary component to the concept of checks and balances in order to maintain
a structural equilibrium.80 Therefore,judicial review is seen as the protector of the
integrity of the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive
branches.8 '
The third set of legal theorists when looking to the rule of law and the
separation of powers doctrine argue that the analysis must be focused on the
concept of conflicts of interest.8 2 These conflicts of interest can arise on three
levels, between the branches themselves, between the functions within a branch, or
when an individual within a branch has an interest in the outcome of a proceeding.83
When conflicts of interest arise on any of these levels there is a need to strengthen
the separation of powers on that level.84 Thus, the conflicts of interest school of
thought focuses on the practical reasons behind constitutional separation and not on
"tautological expressions of branch purpose."85
The three major schools of thought with regard to separation of powers are
the strict separationists, the checks and balances theorists, and theorists that believe
separation of powers should be analyzed from the standpoint of conflicts of interest.
Despite the differences in view that are taken by these scholars when they analyze
the separation of powers doctrine as it serves the rule of law, the role of
administrative agencies poses a problem to which there are no easy answers.8 6
From the rule of law perspective, Dicey saw the problem of comingling the three
powers and functions of the government as the "insurmountable flaw of the
78 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
'9 Medina, supra note 72 at 1554-55.
80 See Sargentich, supra note 71 at 442-43 (addressing the argument that courts should not
intervene and settle separation of powers issues).
81 See id.
82 Verkuil, supra note 60 at 307.
83 Id.
84 Id.
" Id. at 311.
86 Marra, supra note 55 at 778, 783.
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administrative state."87 Further in the view of strict separationists, "administrative
agencies that combine the powers of all three branches of government violate the
Constitution every time these powers are exercised."88  Nevertheless, the
administrative agency is a creature that has been around since the beginning of
American government,89 and is not likely to be disappearing anytime soon.
3. The Need for Certainty - The Taxpayer's Perspective
The modem system of taxation when analyzed from Dicey's first
component of the rule of law appears to be passing with flying colors.90 Recall that
Dicey' s paramount ideal of the rule of law is the supremacy of the written rule over
the discretion of individuals.91 The amount of tax statutes, regulations, and other
guidance has grown at exponential rates since 1913 in order to achieve the utmost
definiteness in the written rule.92 Many have argued that taxation is an over-
legislated area of the law, or suffering from a disease called "hyperlexis." 93
According to Bayless Manning, hyperlexis is a "pathological condition caused by
an overactive law-making gland." 94  Thus, when we look to Dicey's first
requirement of the rule of law that rules must take precedence over the use of
arbitrary discretion, we see that with so many rules it appears unlikely that any
discretion has been left in the system at all.9
Taxpayers are generally in favor of a strong rule-based system in which
they are able to rely on the notice they have been given about how their affairs will
be taxed.96 In fact, tax considerations can strongly influence the decisions that
taxpayers will make with regard to their economic activities.97 For example, a
taxpayer faced with two alternative ways he can invest his income will look to the
tax consequences of each option before making a choice.98 One alternative will
87 Verkuil, supra note 60 at 307 (citing DICEY, supra note 16 at 183-205).
88 Marra, supra note 55 at 789.
89 Id. at 768.
90 See Epstein, supra note 8 at 151 (citing DICEY, supra note 16).
91 DICEY, supra note 16.
92 Colliton, supra note 37 at 265-66.
93 Lipton, supra note 42 at 1-2. See also Henderson, supra note 53, for a discussion of how
too much guidance can actually cause ambiguity and confusion.
94 Manning, supra note 53 at 767.
9' See Colliton, supra note 37 at 266.
96 See Linda A. Schwartzstein, Smoke and Mirrors: Tax Legislation, Uncertainty and
Entrepreneurship, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 62 (1996).
17 See id.
98 See id.
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defer the taxpayer's tax on his earnings so long as the taxpayer does not touch the
investment because the tax law seeks to create an incentive for taxpayers to save for
retirement. The second option requires the taxpayer to pay tax on his earnings on
his investment every year and has no restrictions on when the taxpayer can remove
the money. The taxpayer may well decide that he would like to take advantage of
the tax deferral and invest for retirement. This type of decision making occurs
frequently in reliance upon incentive provisions of the Code for a wide variety of
taxpayers from individuals to businesses. 99
The government is also well aware of the reliance that taxpayers place on
the Internal Revenue Code. °° In fact, tax legislation itself seeks to influence
taxpayer decision-making, and direct behavior into realms that are considered
socially good.'0 ' Tax incentives have been written into the Code in order to further
the government's goals. 102 For example, the Code places incentives for behavior
changes in order to motivate taxpayers to save more, spend more, or invest in
certain ways that the government considers beneficial to the economy. 10 3 The
reward to the taxpayer is a decrease in taxes due, or an increase in a refund due to
the taxpayer," The cash reward to taxpayers provides the incentive that motivates
the taxpayer to change his behavior,105 and for the most part the incentive system
has been successful at motivating taxpayer behavioral changes. Thus, under
Aristotle's theory that effective lawmaking should promote virtuous activity as well
as discouraging vice, the Code and regulations have excelled. 10 6
99 Id. ("The Internal Revenue Code has, in recent years, become the antithesis of a stable
societal institution. Instead, its constant state of flux has created many impediments to
entrepreneurship."). Note the discussion of the need for stable institutions in order to
facilitate entrepreneurial decision making.
'
00 See Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REV.
365, 374 (1988).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 id.
104 id.
105 Id. at 374. Note that the ability of the government to gauge the extent to which a taxpayer
has changed his behavior in response to incentives in the tax code is impossible. Id.
106 See Rosenberg, supra note 100 at 374, 382. Note that the tax system is also seen as
having taxpayer disincentives as the production of income is generally taxable and in some
cases can take away the economic incentive to participating in some economic activities.
Id.
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The legislative and executive branches are not alone in acknowledging
taxpayer reliance. 10 7 In Commissioner v. Newman,10 8 the Court stated in its often
cited words:
Over and over again courts have said that there is
nothing sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to
keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so,
rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any
public duty to pay more than the law demands:
taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary
contributions. To demand more in the name of
morals is mere cant. 10 9
With this statement the government acknowledges that taxpayer reliance on rules
is commonplace and possibly even encouraged, and further does not judge such
behavior as anything other than morally proper." In fact, courts have held that the
taxpayer need for reliance is so great that having a rule that is settled and followed
by taxpayers is sometimes more important than having a correct rule."' Thus, given
that the government actually seeks to promote reliance and influence taxpayer
behavior, it can be argued that the government has created a "right to rely" by
taxpayers on tax guidance." 2
With respect to the rule of law, taxpayer reliance is a function of the notice
that rules provide. A strict rule of law proponent argues that the rule of law requires
that rules provide notice so that people can govern their affairs." 3 Furthermore,
"...they can do so only if laws are understandable, predictable, and fairly
enforced."" 4 Taxpayers require clear rules and notice of those rules so that they can
effectively plan their affairs in accordance with the rules." 5 The government also
seeks taxpayer reliance because it uses tax policy as an instrument to influence
'07 See Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848 (2 nd Cir. 1947).
108 Id.
'0o Id. at 850-51 (Hand, dissenting).
110 See id.
"' Pacific First Fed. Sav. Bank v. Commissioner, 961 F.2d 800, 803 (91, Cir. 1992).
112 United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26,33 (1994). ("Tax legislation is not a promise, and
a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal Revenue Code."). Despite the fact that an
argument from the rule of law perspective can be made that taxpayer reliance is a right, the
Supreme Court has refused to find a constitutional violation of due process based on
taxpayer reliance on the Code.
113 Segall, supra note 63 at 996.
114 
id.
"'s See id.
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behavior toward desired social goals, this is evident from the legislative intent
behind tax legislation.'16 Thus, adequate notice is necessary to influence taxpayer
behavior in order to achieve the government's goals." 7 From the taxpayer and
governmental perspective clear tax guidance is necessary to further effective policy
and to promote the rule of law." 8
4. The Need for Discretion - The Rule Maker's Perspective
a. The Enacting of Anti-Abuse Rules
Although it appears that the realm of tax rulemaking has left the rule of man
completely in favor of the rule of law, some discretion and flexibility are still
necessary for a workable system of tax law promulgation, administration, and
interpretation. 9 As taxation is one of the most complex and broad reaching areas
of the law, the impossibility of legislating for all contingencies is accepted as part
of the status quo. 120 Taxation that seeks to influence behavior toward social policy
must also take into account the fact that taxpayer behavior can sometimes be
influenced beyond the intent of legislation, and circumvent the purposes behind the
laws.12 ' Further, due to the nature of taxpayers in seeking to reduce their liability,
legislators have instituted anti-abuse laws that try to prevent this circumvention of
the purposes behind taxation. 122 These anti-abuse laws have a large degree of
116 Rosenberg, supra note 100, at 374.
117 See id. at 68.
11 See id. at 68-69. Note, Schwartzstein argues that the rule of law has been violated by the
constant changes in the tax laws which hinder taxpayer notice and reliance on tax law. Id.
(quoting Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Reform: The 1980's in Perspective, 46 TAxL. REV. 489,
529 (1991) "The result is tax 'laws,' such as the passive activity loss rules, that defy the very
notion of 'rule by law.' These are not laws in the traditional sense that the citizenry can take
notice of, and accordingly plan their actions. Quite the contrary, it is unclear what activity
or behavior is forbidden...and what is sanctioned...-the very essence of the rule of law. In
many ways, it appears as if the ideal of the rule of law, a principal central to our liberal
political culture, has been largely abandoned in the realm of tax law.").
"9 See James A. Gouwar, The Proposed Partnership Anti-Abuse Regulation: Treasury
Oversteps Its Authority, 11 J. PARTNERSHIPTAX'N 287, 289 (1995). See generally Debroah
A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492 (1995).
120Gouwar, supra note 119 at 287-88"; Daniel Halperin, Are Anti-Abuse Rules Appropriate?,
48 TAX LAW. 807, 808 (1995).
121 See Gouwar, supra note 119 at 287-88. See also Halperin, supra note 120 at 808.
122 Stuart L. Rosow, The Taxation of Economic Reality The Role of Anti-Abuse Rules in Tax
Administration, 416 PLIITAx 493, 497 (1998). See also Hoffman Fuller, The Intent To
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discretion built in to their written law so that unintended taxpayer behavior can be
curtailed. 23 Thus, the system of taxation, despite its rule-based nature, has
recognized the need for governmental discretion and has written such necessary
discretion into tax legislation. 24
Tax law promotes behavior that will aggressively seek to reduce income
taxes. 125 The system, it has been argued, is the source of the aggressive actions of
taxpayers for several reasons. 126 First, the system is a system of self-assessment. 27
In self-assessment systems, the taxpayers are more likely to take chances and
aggressive positions on certain items due to the fact that the chances of audit are
relatively small. 128 Second, the system has an adversarial resolution of disputes,
which encourages settlement by the government due to a lack of resources or will
to prosecute the matter fully. 129 Finally, tax practitioners are sometimes seen as the
impetus behind tax schemes or arrangements that push the envelope on tax
reduction. 3 ° Such arrangements, although sometimes technically correct or
acceptable results of the statutes and regulations, are not the intended results of the
legislation.' Thus, the nature of the system is seen as the true cause of taxpayer
behavior which seeks to aggressively reduce taxes, sometimes to the point of
"abusing" the rules. 32
. Anti-abuse laws have been written in order to combat the inventiveness of
taxpayers who seek to aggressively reduce their income taxes.'33 Most commonly,
anti-abuse rules come in the form of a specific statutory enactment.' This type of
anti-abuse rule is written when a particular abuse has been identified and the
Avoid Tax, 70 TUL. L. REv. 2103 (1996).
123 Rosow, supra note 122 at 497-99.
124 Id. See also Halperin, supra note 120 at 812, 815-16.
125 Rosow, supra note 122 at 497.
126 Id. See generally Fuller, supra note 122.
127 Rosow, supra note 122 at 497.
128 Id. See also David P. Korteling, Let me Tell you how it will be; Here's one for you,
Nineteen for me: Modifying the Internal Revenue Service's Approach to Resolving Tax
Disputes, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 659 (1994).
129 Rosow, supra note 122 at 497.
130 Id. at 497-98.
'' Id. at 498. See also Sheldon I. Banoff, The Use And Misuse of Anti-Abuse Rules, 48 TAX
LAW. 827, 835-36 (1995).
132 Rosow, supra note 122 at 497. Note Rosow does not attempt to define what taxpayer
actions constitute "abuse," but that inevitably abuses do occur.
'
33 Id. at 497.
'14 Id. at 501. See generally Banoff, supra note 131 at 827-28.
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enactment's purpose is to rectify the situation. 135 Other more general statutory anti-
abuse rules have been written to espouse a specific statutory intent or purpose
behind a provision, so that general abuses which do not conform to the legislative
intent can be prevented.'36 Finally, judicially created anti-abuse rules generally are
used by the courts in a broad and principle oriented approach to a taxpayer action. 37
All three types of anti-abuse rules have been utilized to prevent the inventive
taxpayer from circumventing the government's intent behind tax rules. 1
38
Despite the ease of categorizing anti-abuse rules, defining anti-abuse rules
can be difficult. 139 Frank V. Battle Jr. defines anti-abuse rules by stating:
In its purist form, an anti-abuse rule is a rule
designed to prevent a taxpayer from achieving a
result which is inconsistent with a dominant
policy of the law by altering the tax consequences
which would otherwise have flowed from a
transaction, to others more consistent with that
policy. 14
However, other definitions of anti-abuse rules take a more policy oriented
approach. 4' Pamela Olson states: "anti-abuse provisions are necessary to
encourage the exercise of sound judgment...., rather than the mechanical
application of complex and detailed rules which may lead to results not anticipated
and not consistent with statutory intent."'42 Thus, the definitions of anti-abuse rules
are somewhat based on the purpose or intent with which anti-abuse rules are
enacted. "' Therefore, to adequately understand how the anti-abuse rule should be
viewed with respect to the rule of law, a person must look toward the reason for the
3 Stuart L. Rosow, The Taxation of Economic Reality: The Role ofAnti-Abuse Rules in Tax
Administration, 431 PLI/TAX 1215, 1219 (1998).
136 Id.
137 Id.
131 Id. See also Banoff, supra note 131 at 827-28.
139 Rosow, supra note 122 at 499-500.
'40 Frank V. Battle, Jr., The Appropriateness of Anti-Abuse Rules in the U.S. Income Tax
Systems, 48 TAX LAW. 801, 802 (1995).
141 Rosow, supra note 122 at 499-500.
142 See Pamela Olson, Some Thoughts on Anti-Abuse Rules, 48 TAX LAW. 817, 817 (1995).
143 Rosow, supra note 122 at 499-500.
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anti-abuse rule's enactment, and to the goals that it was meant to achieve or the
functions it was meant to perform.'"
Just as several different types of anti-abuse rules exist, there are many
different reasons for their enactment. 45 First, as articulated previously, anti-abuse
rules are enacted to correct perceived abusive transactions. 4 6 Second, anti-abuse
rules have the purpose of illustrating statutory policy or explaining legislative intent
behind tax provisions.'47 Third, anti-abuse rules satisfy the taxpayer's and
practitioner's desire for more guidance on the tax laws and their intended
operation.'48 Fourth, the protection of the government fisc is an important goal of
anti-abuse rules.'49 Anti-abuse rules protect the fisc in two main ways, first by
generally deterring transactions that will deplete the government's funds coming in,
and second by providing solutions to revenue losses from misuse of provisions. 5 °
Fifth, anti-abuse rules are seen as the promoters of fairness because they place
taxpayers who seek out tax advisors and taxpayers who do not on the same
plateau.' 51 Sixth, anti-abuse rules are supposed to promote simplification of the
complexity contained in the Code.'52 General principles allow Congress and the
Treasury the flexibility to promulgate shorter more concise rules. 53 Finally, anti-
abuse rules are intended to act as a deterrent or warning to taxpayers who are
considering playing the audit "gamble.' '154 Anti-abuse rules have been enacted to
serve many specific purposes, arguably their greatest overall function is to return
some amount of discretion back to the rule-based system of taxation.'55
Anti-abuse rules appear to be the solution to the problem of overly
aggressive taxpayers abusing the system, 56 because the rules replace some of the
discretion back into the tax system that has been eliminated by over-legislation. In
fact the trend in tax rule promulgation has been toward placing general anti-abuse
'44 See Rosow, supra note 135 at 1220-21 (discussing purposes of anti-abuse rules). See
also Banoff, supra note 131 at 827-28 (discussing purposes and characteristics of anti-abuse
rules).
14' Rosow, supra note 135 at 1244.
'46 Id. See also Banoff, supra note 131 at 828.
14' Rosow, supra note 135 at 1244. See also Banoff, supra note 131 at 830.
148 Rosow, supra note 135 at 1244.
149 id.
'
50 Id. See also Banoff, supra note 131 at 831-32.
15' Rosow, supra note 135 at 1244.
152 id.
153 Id. See also Banoff, supra note 131 at 830-31.
154 Rosow, supra note 135 at 1244. See also Banoff, supra note 131 at 831-32.
155 See Rosow, supra note 135, at 1245.
156 Rosow, supra note 122 at 498-99. See also Banoff, supra note 131 at 831-33.
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rules into statutes, and where there are not statutes, into the regulations proposed
by the Treasury. 57 However, anti-abuse rules do pose problems from a rule of law
standpoint. 158 First, the generality of anti-abuse rules which grant discretion to the
Service can lead to the Service abusing its power over taxpayers. 59 In some
situations the Service has used the power granted to them under anti-abuserules to
try to override precedents that have been long established. 6 ° Second, most anti-
abuse rules remove predictability so that taxpayers cannot make decisions and act
with certainty. 6' This lack of certainty and negative impact on decision making
stems from the fact that taxpayers have no knowledge as to what the tax
consequences of their actions will be. 162 Finally, from a pragmatic standpoint, anti-
abuse rules can lead to the unnecessary interference by the Service in transactions
that are legitimate. 163 It is just such harassment of the individual by the government
that the rule of law seeks to prevent."6 Therefore, anti-abuse rules, although a
necessary mode of returning discretion to the system of taxation, do pose problems
from the rule of law perspective. 165
In summary, discretion is necessary to any system of law as Aristotle
noted. 66 The government has tried to restore a level of discretion back into the tax
system through the enactment orjudicial creation of anti-abuse rules. 167 These rules
have been necessary because taxpayers aggressively seek to reduce their taxes to the
point of abusing the system and circumventing the legislative intent behind tax
rules. 6  Further, anti-abuse rules and the discretion they provide are necessary
because the legislature is incapable of creating a rule for every conceivable
contingency or transaction. 69 However, from the rule of law standpoint, the
creation of and the use of anti-abuse rules is not without flaws. 70 The problems
17 Rosow, supra note 122 at. 499. See also Banoff, supra note 131 at 827.
158 See Rosow, supra note 122 at 498.
'5' See Gouwar, supra note 119 at 292. See also Banoff, supra note 131 at 835.
'
6 0 Gouwar, supra note 119 at 292. See also Banoff, supra note 131 at 837; Frank Lyon Co.
v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Newman v. Commissioner, 902 F.2d 159 (2d Cir.
1990); Uniroyal Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2690 (1993).
161 Gouwar, supra note 119 at 292. See also Banoff, supra note 131 at 835-36.
162 Gouwar, supra note 119 at 292. See also Halperin, supra note 120 at 809.
163 Rosow, supra note 135 at 1245. See also Halperin, supra note 120 at 808-09.
164 See Rosow, supra note 135 at 1245-46.
165 See id. See generally Banoff, supra note 131.
166 ARISTOTLE, supra note 2.
167 See Rosow, supra note 122 at 499-500.
161 Id. at 497.
169 See Halperin, supra note 120 at 808.
170 See id. at 292.
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arise when the discretionary power granted to the Service is abused.171 Instead of
using the anti-abuse rule to further one of the seven goals listed above, the Service
uses the discretionary power to rewrite laws and precedents, or interfere with
legitimate transactions.17 Finally, the anti-abuse rule is problematic because it
reduces taxpayer certainty as to how his affairs and transactions will be taxed. 73
Despite the problems that anti-abuse rules foster, most practitioners as well as
lawmakers would agree that anti-abuse rules are necessary to the system of
taxation. 74 Therefore, the anti-abuse rule, although subject to criticism from a rule
of law standpoint, will not likely disappear from the system of taxation despite its
problems. 175
b. Retroactive Legislation
The tax system also restores discretion with the use of retroactivity in its
legislative enactments. 76 This return of discretion through retroactivity is utilized
by both the Congress and the Internal Revenue Service when they promulgate
rules. 77 The Supreme Court has stated that due process is not necessarily offended
by the enactment of retroactive legislation. 78 This reasoning holds that the system
of taxation, unlike other areas of the law, is a system of apportionment of the burden
of supporting the government and not a penalty or a contractual liability. 79 Further,
no citizen is allowed to escape their civic burden of supporting the government, as
they are privileged by the benefits of the government by virtue of their
citizenship.' Therefore, imposing a taxing statute retroactively does not
171 Id. See generally Banoff, supra note 131.
172 Rosow, supra note 135 at 1245. See also Banoff, supra note 131 at 836-37.
173 Gouwar, supra note 119 at 292. See also Banoff, supra note 131 at 835.
174 Rosow, supra note 122 at 499. See also Halperin, supra note 120 at 812.
17' Rosow, supra note 122 at 499 (discussing increase in use of anti-abuse rules). See also
Banoff, supra note 131 at 828-34 (discussing why the rules are increasingly utilized and the
justifications for such rules).
176 See generally Stephen k. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEX. L. REV.
425 (1982).
177 Benjamin J. Cohen & Catherine A. Harrington, Is The Internal Revenue Service Bound
by its Own Regulations and Rulings, ? 51 TAX LAW. 675,675 (1998), citing Manhattan Gen.
Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129 (1936).
17"8 Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-147 (1938). See also United States v. Carlton, 512
U.S. 26 (1994) (describing a specific instance in which a taxpayer was caught in the web of
retroactive legislation when he had previously relied on a rule).
1' Welch 305 U.S. at 146.
180 Id. at 147.
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necessarily offend due process, and no unconditional "right" to rely on tax
legislation has been recognized by the Supreme Court.
1 8 1
Retroactive legislation is enacted for a variety of reasons in the law of
taxation, and for the most part the government does what it can to mitigate the
effects of retroactivity. 1 2 Most often retroactive legislation is written to correct
mistakes or errors in the function of tax provisions and is therefore justified.'8 3 The
government's efforts to mitigate the hardship caused to taxpayers by.changing a law
on which they have previously relied are noteworthy. 184 For example, at one time
the dividends paid on shares of stock in the form of stock were not taxable but cash
dividends paid were. 185 Taxpayers tended to arrange their investments in reliance
on the tax law, and purchase stock that paid dividends in stock rather than cash to
avoid taxation. 8 6 Congress decided to correct this error, or loophole, in the Code
and used a retroactive provision to do so. 87 Instead of making the rule harshly
retroactive, Congress enacted a twenty-one year phase out period so that taxpayers
would not be saddled with a large tax burden or forced to change their investments
suddenly. 188 Thus, the government seeks to impose upon itself a limitation on the
use of retroactivity and when retroactivity is necessary, it generally will try to
protect the interests of those who have relied upon the old tax law to their detriment
under the new law. 189
Despite its constitutionality and despite Congress' efforts to minimize the
negative effects on the taxpayer, retroactive legislation can create problems from
a rule of law standpoint.1 90 Generally, the rule of law value of fairness is
compromised when the laws are changed after they have been relied upon.'9 ' As
Steven R. Munzer states:
181 See id. at 146-47.
182 Munzer, supra note 176 at 449. See also Cohen & Harrington, supra note 177, citing
Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129 (1936).
183 See Munzer, supra note 176 at 450.
184 See id. at 449.
185 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, § 421 (a) (1969) (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
186 Munzer, supra note 176 at 449.
187 id.
188 See id.
189 See id. at 448-50. The author uses the term entrenching to show how Congress tends to
protect the property interests of taxpayers when enacting retroactive legislation.
'90 Munzer, supra note 176 at 425.
191 See id.
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The central purpose of law is to guide behavior.
When legislatures create rules, a person properly
forms expectations about how the legal system
will respond to his actions. Retroactive laws
frustrate the central purpose of law by disrupting
expectations and actions taken in reliance on
them. This disruption is always costly and rarely
defensible. 92
Thus, retroactivity has generally been frowned upon because it is an unfair
legislative act that defeats taxpayer expectations. 193 The rule of law value of giving
citizens notice from rules that are fixed and publicly known in advance is also
compromised.'94 This violation of rule of law principles hinders the ability of a
taxpayer to plan his activities according to the rules that govern his behavior.'95
Therefore, retroactive laws in taxation are difficult to reconcile from a rule of law
standpoint, and can be hard to justify despite the lack of a judicially acknowledged
right to rely.'96
Retroactive legislation is problematic when analyzing it in light of rule of
law principles because it seeks to change the rules that govern behavior either
during or after the behavior has taken place. 97 Given that the rule of law stands for
the stability of societal institutions that govern citizen behavior, these changes are
a direct violation of the rule of law. 9 ' However, because Congress chooses to use
retroactive legislation sparingly, and generally when it does so, it tries to protect the
interests .of those who will be affected, retroactive legislation is generally
permitted.' 99 Further, due to the fact that the Supreme Court has held that the Code
does not grant the right to rely, no constitutional violation necessarily occurs
192 Id. at 426-27. See also Cohen & Harrington, supra note 177 at 675 (arguing that the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 may also frown upon retroactive legislation and discourage its
use).
113 Munzer, supra note 176 at 426-27.
19 4 id.
195 Id. See also Cohen & Harrington, supra note 177 at 678-79 (arguing that retroactivity
is an abuse of discretion).
196 Munzer, supra note 176 at 426-27.
197 See id. at 425.
198 See Schwartzstein, supra note 96 at 76 and supra Section II.A.
199 Munzer, supra note 176 at 448-50.
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either.2°" Therefore, retroactive tax legislation has governmental support and in
many instances is considered a justified violation of the rule of law.2°'
C. Summary of The Rule of Law in the Tax Realm
The rule of law is a fluid conceptual framework that provides guidance as
to how a workable system of laws should function. As Aristotle noted, both a
system of written laws and a system of equity or discretion are necessary in order
to fulfill the principles of the rule of law and have an effective government.2"2 The
rule of man and the rule of law must always be balanced against each other, and the
balance should be maintained with an eye toward the principles A. V. Dicey
illustrated.20 3 Furthermore, the rule of law is necessary from both the standpoint of
the government that is applying the law and from the standpoint of the citizens
bound by it.2° 4 From constitutional scholars we glean three separate requirements
of the rule of law, the first requirement is that a system of written laws should
predominate over a system of individual discretion.20 5 Second, equality must be
maintained so that all citizens are subject to the law, and all similarly situated
citizens are treated equally by it.206 Finally, the government must have limited
powers, adhere to separation of powers principles, and be subject to adequate
judicial review.20 7
The rule of law as it applies to the system of taxation has many
implications. The law of taxation has radically changed since its early years when
it was a simple system of broadly worded rules that relied on the judicial system to
interpret and clarify the system. 2°8 The role of the Internal Revenue Service
administrative agency has expanded.2 9 The administrative agency has promulgated
rules that Congress does not have the expertise to legislate itself, and has done so
more effectively and efficiently. 210  However, the rise of the use of the
administrative agency poses special separation of powers problems. 1 Most often
200 See Welch 305 U.S. at 146-147.
20' Munzer, supra note 176 at 448-50.
202 ARISTOTLE, supra note 2.
203 Epstein, supra note 8 at 151. (citing DICEY, supra note 16).
204 See Fallon, supra note 5 at 3.
205 Epstein, supra note 8 at 151. (citing DICEY, supra note 16).
206See id.
207 See supra Section II.B.2.
208 See Colliton, supra note 37 at 265-67.
209 Marra, supra note 55 at 767.
210 Id. at 777.
211 Verkuil, supra note 60 at 307.
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these problems are analyzed from the standpoint that the government should
function with a system of checks and balances to prevent the concentration of power
in any one area. 2  This school of thought recognizes the necessity of the
administrative agency to the system of tax law, but will find a constitutional
violation when the agency is guilty of "undue" or "excessive" use of power.213
Furthermore, the concept of judicial review is seen as the restraining hand on
agency power when the legislative and executive branches do not maintain some
degree of separation of powers.214
The rule of law also seeks to maintain a balanced system with some
discretion intermingled in a system comprised of primarily rule-based laws. In this
regard we must look to the two competing forces on the continuum. First, the
taxpayer prefers a system of definite written rules upon which he can rely in making
his decisions.215 The government also appears to favor such concreteness because
taxpayer reliance on incentives is the best way to further the social policy goals of
the government.21 6 The courts have further acknowledged taxpayer reliance on tax
law is an important aspect to the function of the tax system, and have stopped just
short of proclaiming that taxpayers have a right to rely on tax guidance.21 7
The other side of the coin is the need for discretion. Most often the
government is the biggest proponent of adding more discretion into the system so
that it will be given a tool to combat unanticipated taxpayer behavior without
resorting to congressional enactments every time a problem arises.2 18  The
government has enacted anti-abuse rules in several different ways. 219 Most
obviously opposed to rule of law values, is the broadly worded statutory enactment
that codifies legislative intent and purpose behind a statute.220 These anti-abuse
rules place a great deal of discretion back into the government's hands and
consequently reduce taxpayer certainty and ability to rely on the written statute.22'
Finally, the use of retroactive legislation also returns a certain amount of discretion
back to the government.222 Despite the fact that retroactive legislation does not
212 Marra, supra note 55 at 779-85.
213 See Sargentich, supra note 71 at 440-41.
214 See Medina, supra note 72 at 1554-55.
215 See Schwartzstein, supra note 96 at 62.
216 See Rosenberg, supra note 100 at 374.
217 See Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, dissenting).
218 See Rosow, supra note 122 at 527-31.
219 Id. at 501.
220 See Id. at 498-99, 528.
221 Gouwar, supra note 119 at 292.
222 See generally Munzer, supra note 176.
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offend due process, it undeniably offends the rule of law regardless of the
justification behind such an enactment.223
The rule of law has many implications when it is applied to the realm of tax
law. The task now is to determine if, given these values in our governmental
system, the rule of law has been compromised too much to the discretion of the rule
of man so that the system is invalid in the eyes of the rule of law. Although even
the most renowned scholars have difficulty in determining when the rule of law has
been overly offended, some guidance can be found. The discussion must move on
to the more specific analysis of §446, and the Commissioner's clear reflection of
income powers.
II. §446 - THE COMMISSIONER'S CLEAR REFLECTION OF INCOME POWER
A. §446 - The General Rule for Methods of Accounting and its Exception
Section 446 of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted to give guidance to
taxpayers as to what type of accounting method is acceptable for computing taxable
income.224 "Although a number of code provisions form the skeletal framework of
tax accounting, the backbone of this statutory scheme is indisputably section
446. ' ' 225 Thus, §446 is considered to be the fundamental provision that gives
guidance to taxpayers about methods of accounting.226 Generally, the provision
holds that the method acceptable is the method used by the taxpayer in keeping his
books.227 The provision also lists specific acceptable methods, which include the
cash receipts and disbursements method, the accrual method, or a hybrid method so
long as it has been permitted by the Code or the Secretary.228 Further, the provision
provides that a taxpayer, who has used a specific method of accounting and wishes
to changes his method, must obtain the consent of the Secretary before he
223 id.
224 I.R.C. § 446 (1994). Note that the term method of accounting is used to describe both
an overall method for accounting for revenues and expenses as well as methods that are used
to apply to single items of revenue or expense, Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(1) (as amended in
1999).
225 Francis M. Allegra, Section 482: Mapping the Contours of the Abuse of Discretion
Standard of Judicial Review, 13 VA. TAX REV. 423, 475 (1994).
226 id.
227 § 446(a).
228 § 446(c).
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determines his taxable income using the new method.229 If a taxpayer does not
obtain such consent, he could be subject to penalties or additional taxes.23
Section 446 also contains a broadly worded statutory anti-abuse rule, which
states the policy behind the provision. 23 This anti-abuse rule takes the form of an
exception to the general rule that a taxpayer may use an accounting method for the
computation of taxable income that is used ordinarily in computing the taxpayers
books.232 The exception states: "If no method of accounting has been regularly
used by the taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the
computation of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion
of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income. 233 The statute is silent as to the
definition of what "clearly reflect income" means and only gives the language itself
as guidance. 3 The language tends to grant two separate powers to the Secretary.235
First, the Secretary has the power to determine whether a taxpayer's method of
determining taxable income is accurate.236 Second, the Secretary has the power to
choose an alternative method of accounting for the taxpayer that, in his opinion,
does clearly reflect taxable income.237 Thus, the Secretary has the power to
determine if a violation of the statute has taken place and the power to remedy the
violation by requiring a taxpayer to recompute his income under a new method.238
The concept of a "clear reflection of income" does not have a definition in
the Code and also does not have a definition in the regulations that accompany
§446.239 However, some guidance can be gleaned from the regulations.24
Regulation 1.446-1(a)(2) states in part that no uniform method of accounting will
be the correct method for all taxpayers and thus, some leeway is given to the
taxpayer to pick a method that will work for his business and industry.241 The
Regulation states:
229 § 446(e).
230 § 446(f). Note: Although an interesting topic, the procedures and implications of a
change in accounting methods under § 446 is not the focus of this article.231 § 446(b).
232 § 446(a) & (b).
233 § 446(b).
234 See id.
235 See id.
236 See id.
237 See id.
238 See id.
239 Allegra, supra note 225 at 475-76.
240 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1997).
241 Id.
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A method of accounting which reflects the
consistent application of generally accepted
accounting principles in a particular trade or
business in accordance with accepted conditions
or practices in that trade or business will
ordinarily be regarded as clearly reflecting
income, provided all items of gross income and
expense are treated consistently from year to
year.
24 2
Thus, a taxpayer who computes his income based on generally accepted accounting
principles, or "G.A.A.P.," has a fighting chance for clearly reflecting his income,
but cannot rely on that factor alone to demonstrate compliance.24 3 The Regulation,
rather than creating a safeharbor for taxpayers, gives the taxpayer guidance as to
one of the factors that the Secretary uses in his analysis to determine whether an
accounting method clearly reflects the taxpayer's income.2 4
The Code and Regulation create ambiguity for the taxpayer who wishes to
know whether his accounting method clearly reflects his income.245 This ambiguity
is directly caused by the statutory language of the anti-abuse rule that seeks to grant
discretionary power to the Secretary. 246 Section 446 is discretion-conferring
because it relies upon the opinion of a person to make the determination, a rule of
man judgment.247 The regulations provide little guidance as well because they seek
to protect the reserved discretion given to the Secretary and only give taxpayers one
factor that will guide the decision as to whether the method of accounting they have
selected will clearly reflect income.248 Therefore, the taxpayer must turn to the
courts for guidance as to how §446 will function and in order to find a definition for
the language "clearly reflect income. 249
242 Id.
243 Clement v. United States, 580 F.2d 422, 430 (Ct. C1. 1978).
244 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2) (1999).
245 See Allegra, supra note 225 at 475-76.
246 See § 446(b).
247 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (a)(2) (1999).
248 See id.
249 Rosow, supra note 122 at 509-10.
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B. Judicially Developed Guidance
The Service and courts have focused on a number of factors when making
a determination as to whether a taxpayer has clearly reflected his income. 250 As
stated in the regulations, one of the biggest factors is whether the taxpayer has used
a method of accounting that is in accordance with G.A.A.P.2 51 Although
compliance is not in and of itself considered determinative, a taxpayer who
conforms to G.A.A.P. will have a greater chance of clearly reflecting his income.252
Another factor to be considered is whether the taxpayer's accounting method is
reflective of industry practice in general. 253 A taxpayer who uses the same system
of accounting as the majority of taxpayers in his industry will be more likely to
clearly reflect income than a taxpayer using a novel method or one that does not
have wide support for its use.254
Another factor is based on the consistency of the taxpayer's use of this
accounting method. 5 As the Regulation states, consistency in the application will
strengthen a taxpayer's likelihood of having a method that clearly reflects
income. 256 The Internal Revenue Service's reaction to a method of accounting is
also a factor used by the courts in determining clear reflection.257 If a taxpayer uses
a method that has received prior favorable treatment by the Service, then courts will
more likely find clear reflection than if the taxpayer used a method that the Service
did not give favorable consideration. 258 Finally, another factor to consider is
whether a method has enjoyed an absence of challenge by the Service for a long
period of time. 259 The method is more likely to clearly reflect income if it has not
been challenged by the Service.26' These factors must be weighed in view of each
other as no one factor will be determinative in all cases, and a different combination
of factors will be important depending on the facts and circumstances of the
situation. Therefore, the discretion conferred by Congress in §446 is protected by
the Treasury and the courts, and a facts and circumstances analysis is necessary in
all clear reflection of income cases.
250 Rosow, supra note 135 at 1227-28.
251 Garth v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 610, 619 (1971).
252 Id. at 619-23.
253 Public Service Co. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 445, 456 (1982).
254 See Rosow, supra note 135 at 1227.
255 Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 286-87 (1967).
256 See id.
257 Pierce Ditching Co. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 301, 306 (1979).
258 Id.
259 Public Service Co. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 445, 456 (1982).
260 See id.
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IV. THE ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. The Source & Definition of The Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review
In 1946, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act, or "A.P.A.,"
in order to place a check on the power of administrative agencies.26' The A.P.A.
designed a provision that gives courts a standard for reviewing the determinations
of agencies.2 62 The stated purpose behind the A.P.A.'s provision was "to restate the
law ofjudicial review.' '263 Thus, some definitional guidance about the standard can
be gained from looking to the statute.264 Further, non-tax administrative agency
decisions made by the Supreme Court can shed some light on the standard of
review.265 Comparing the abuse of discretion standard to other standards of review
will also prove helpful in understanding how the standard is used by the courts.
Thus, the A.P.A. and some related case law will help to define the abuse of
discretion standard of review before we foray into its taxation application.
The Administrative Procedure Act §706(2)(A) 266 states the standard of
review for courts when reviewing an agency determination:
To the extent necessary to decision and when
presented, the reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall . . . (2) hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law; ... (E) unsupported by
substantial 'evidence in a case subject to sections
556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on
261 Currently 5 U.S.C. § 551-§ 559, § 701-§ 706, § 1305, § 3105, § 3344, § 4301, § 5335,
§ 5372, § 7521 (1994).
262 id.
263 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 9 (1973).
264 Allegra, supra note 225 at 456-57. "Judges writing tax opinions characteristically expend
few words (often the same ones) describing the mechanics of abuse of discretion review."
Id. at 473.
261 Id. at 458-60.
266 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
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the record of an agency hearing provided by
statute; or (F) unwarranted by the facts to the
extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by
the reviewing court.267
The stated intention of this language was to reiterate the general notion of judicial
review. 268 The legislative history states further that this statement ofjudicial review
was not meant to change the way courts have always adjudicated such cases.2 69 In
fact the legislative history states in part that under the notion of judicial review,
courts with proper jurisdiction have always had the power to overturn cases that
were not in accordance with the law, arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. 270 Therefore, the A.P.A. simply codified what the legislature considered
to be a general notion of judicial review. 1
The Supreme Court in dealing with the A.P.A. standard has articulated that
the courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of the agency making the
determination. 272 In fact, the courts' primary function is to evaluate the choice of
the administrative agency looking to all the relevant facts to see if there has been
a "clear error of judgment" by the agency.273 In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. ,274
the Court articulated four ways in which an agency's determination or actions are
arbitrary and capricious:
275
[I]f the agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision
that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
267 id.
268 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 263, at 9.
269 Allegra, supra note 225 at 457-58 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 263, at 9).
270 id.
271 id.
272 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), overruled
by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
2 7 3 id.
274 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
275 Id. at 42.
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ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
276agency expertise.
The Court thus articulates its limitations and the circumstances that call forjudicial
overturning of agency actions.277 The Court's position has been summarized as
insuring that agencies use reasoned decision-making in determinations.278
Therefore, the court system's role in judicially reviewing agency determinations is
primarily to make sure the decision-making process was rational, and not
necessarily whether the decision itself was the decision the court would have
reached. 279 However, the substantive decision is subject to reversal in cases where
the result is not within the bounds of reasoned decision-making.2 °
The abuse of discretion standard of review involves the use of such terms
as arbitrary, capricious, and lack of rationality. 28  This standard of review, as
defined by the courts, appears to place quite a restriction on the court's ability to
interfere in agency determinations.282 Conversely, the legislative history states that
§706(2)(A) of the A.P.A. was only meant to restate the concept of judicial review,
which would appear to be a less strict view than the Supreme Court's vision of the
standard.283 However, it is difficult to gauge just how restrictive the standard is
without looking to other standards of review to help place the abuse of discretion
standard on a continuum of judicial power.284
The standard that grants a court the most power to determine cases is the
"de novo" standard of review. 285 Under de novo review, the court is allowed to
make its own independent determination of the substantive issues involved in an
administrative proceeding.286 However, even under de novo review, the court is
sometimes bound to give deference to an administrative interpretation.28 7 The next
276 Id. at 43.
277 id.
278 See United States v. Garner, 767 F.2d 104, 116 (5t Cir. 1985).
279 See id.
280 Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87,
104-06 (1983).
281 Allegra, supra note 225 at 460.
282 See id.
283 Id. at 457 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 269 at 9).
284 Id. at 461-62.
285 Id. at 462.
286 Id. (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 690 (1980)).
287 Allegra, supra note 225 at 463. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
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standard along the continuum is the "clearly erroneous" standard of review.2"'
Under this standard, the court is more restricted than under de novo because the
court is allowed to review the entire body of evidence under which the agency made
its determination, and only if the administrative agency has made a mistake can its
determination be overruled.289 Thus, only when the court holds a definite and firm
conviction that the agency made a mistake can it change the determination made by
the agency.29°
The "substantial evidence" standard of review restricts the courts more than
the previous two standards. 291 The purpose of the substantial evidence standard is
to have the court determine that "there is a relatively high probability that the
agency's determination is correct. 292 Thus, the substantive question's correctness
should almost be ignored and the court should look to see if a reasonable person
could come to the same decision based on all the relevant factors.293 Substantial
evidence thus becomes a mostly procedural question, and a higher degree of error
from the administrative agency can be tolerated than under the previous two.
standards.294 Finally along the spectrum of standards of review, the abuse of
discretion or arbitrary and capricious standard of review falls the furthest toward
procedural inquiry and error toleration.295 According to Maurice Rosenberg, under
the abuse of discretion standard of review, the agency's decision is protected by:
a kevlar shield, theoretically all but impregnable
to the reviewing court's prodding, provided that
the agency's decision has been forged in a process
in which it considered all relevant factors and
balanced those factors in a rational fashion. In
short, an agency operating under this standard is
granted an uncommon privilege in the American
legal system - 'a limited right to be wrong ...
without being reversed.' 296
288 Allegra, supra note 225 at 464-65.
219 d.at 465. (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
290 Allegra, supra note 225 at 465 (citing Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395).
291 Allegra, supra note 225 at 467.
292 Id. at 469. (citing 2 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.4
(1985)).
293 Allegra, supra note 225 at 469.
294 Id. at 469-70.
295 Id. at 470-72.
296 Id. at 473. (quoting Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court: Viewed
from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 649 (1971)).
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Thus, the abuse of discretion standard of review is the most limited in scope, and
the standard that most binds the hands of the courts reviewing an agency's
determination.297
In summary, the A.P.A. has given guidance as to the definition of the abuse
of discretion standard of review.298 The standard was created with the purpose to
reinstate judicial review over administrative agency determinations. 299 The
Supreme Court has noted that under the standard, a court can only invalidate a
determination when the determination is irrational or not based upon all the relevant
factors that should have been taken into account.3" In no way does this standard
of review allow a court to invalidate a determination simply because it would have
come to a different conclusion than the agency. 301 Furthermore, when looking to
the continuum of review granted to courts, the abuse of discretion standard limits
the power of the courts to the greatest extent when compared to the other
standards.30 2 Thus, the reversal of an agency determination when the court is
limited to the abuse of discretion standard of review should be rare and only occur
in the most extreme of cases.30 3
B. Fleshing Out The Abuse of Discretion Standard - Judicial Tax Determinations
The abuse of discretion standard is the standard of review courts use when
the Commissioner has determined a taxpayer does not clearly reflect his income
under §446.304 As scholars have noted, courts in §446 cases generally do not spend
much of their opinions dissecting or defining the standard of review they will be
using in the case.30 5 Courts instead apply the standard in taxation cases based on
their experience and understanding of the standard with very conclusory methods.3 6
The first part of this section will discuss the burden of proof placed on the taxpayer
in §446 clear reflection of income cases. Next, guidance will be taken from §446
cases where the taxpayer has prevailed by analyzing some of the language the courts
have used in illustrating what an abuse of discretion is. Finally, the difficulty that
297 See Allegra, supra note 225 at 473.
298 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
299 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 263, at 9.
301 United States v. Gamer, 767 F.2d 104, 116 (5t' Cir. 1985).
301 Id.
302 Allegra, supra note 225 at 473.
303 Id. at 472.
3' Id. at 478-79 (citing Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 532-33
(1979)).305 Id. at 473.
306 Id.
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the abuse of discretion standard of review places on the courts will be illustrated by
showing when great legal minds have differed in their opinion of how the standard
functions.
The burden of proof in clear reflection of income cases is placed solely on
the taxpayer who is challenging the Service's determination.3 7 The taxpayer must
prove that the Commissioner has abused his power and discretion in coming to his
determination that the taxpayer is not clearly reflecting income.30 8 Because there
are two separate and distinct powers granted to the Service in deciding §446 cases,
the power to find that the taxpayer has not clearly reflected income and the power
to choose an alternative method of accounting for the taxpayer, the taxpayer appears
to have a choice in showing where the Service has abused its power.30 9 However,
a taxpayer will not win his case unless he has shown that the Service was abusing
its discretion with respect to the determination that the taxpayer's accounting
method did not clearly reflect income.310 Thus, the thrust of the issue of the burden
of proof, is to show that the chosen method by the-taxpayer is clearly reflective of
income, and that the Commissioner did not rationally come to his conclusion.
311
Because the regulations state that generally a method of accounting that is
in conformity with G.A.A.P., will be found to clearly reflect income, some
taxpayers have argued that they have met their burden.312 The crux of this argument
is that they have met a burden by proving their conformity with G.A.A.P. and thus,
the burden of proof should shift to the Commissioner to prove that the taxpayer
does not clearly reflect income.3 13 However, the courts have not given this
argument weight because the regulations are only meant to be a guideline to the
taxpayer, and do not statutorily provide for a burden shifting to the
Commissioner.31 4 The courts have further held that the establishment of any other
specific fact will also not shift the burden of proof to the Service.315 Thus, the
307 Thor, 439 U.S. at 532. See also Tog Shop v. United States, 721 F.Supp. 300 (M.D. Ga.
1989), aff'd, 916 F.2d 720 (1 ld Cir. 1990).
308 Thor, 439 U.S. at 533.
'09 Asphalt Products Co. v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 843, 847 (6 Cir. 1986), rev'd,
Commissioner v. Asphalt Products Co., 482 U.S. 117 (1987). See also Allegra, supra note
225 at 478.
3'0 Allegra, supra note 225 at 479.
311 Id. at 478-79.
312 Thor, 439 U.S. at 538-40; American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 693
(1961).
313 Thor, 439 U.S. at 538-39.
314 See id. at 540.
315 See id.
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burden of proof throughout the litigation of a clear reflection of income case rests
solely with the taxpayer.316 In the words of the late Justice Brandeis, the taxpayer
bears a "heavy burden of proof' in clear reflection of income cases.
317
A few words have been said about the standard of review in §446 cases.
For example, the standard has been drawn out by Justice Blackmun who stated that
the Service's determination will not be overturned unless it is plainly arbitrary.1
In Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner,319 quoting Lucas v. American Code
Co.,320 the Court stated that: "Since the Commissioner has 'much latitude for
discretion,' his interpretation of the statute's clear-reflection standard 'should not
be interfered with unless clearly unlawful. ,, 32' Therefore, the Court combined the
concept of the abuse of discretion standard in terms of the lawfulness of the actions
of the administrative agency.322 However, the lawfulness of the agency action
relates back to A.P.A.'s definition ofjudicial review. 323 Hence, no further guidance
is really gained from the few words the Court used to describe the standard of
review. But, the Court does recognize that the standard of review has some teeth
to it when, as it was upholding the Commissioner's determination, it stated "the
Commissioner's discretion is not unbridled and may not be arbitrary . . 324
Therefore, the Court does allude to the fact that in some cases the Commissioner
will be reversed, and the abuse of discretion standard of review will not always
require the courts to uphold the determinations of the Commissioner.325
316 See id.
317 Id. at 532. (quoting Lucas v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 281 U.S. 264, 271
(1930)). Note The Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3 contains a change in the burden of proof for
the litigation of tax cases. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7491 (West Supp. 1999). The change states
that upon the showing of credible evidence by the taxpayer in a court proceeding the burden
of proof will shift to the Commissioner to prove his case. § 7491 (a)(1). This change
applies to tax litigation stemming from examinations that begin after the date of enactment.
Thus, the effects of the change in the burden of proof, if any, will not be evident for some
time.
318 Thor, 439 U.S. at 533. (citing Lucas, 281 U.S. at 271).
319 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
320 280 U.S. 445 (1930).
321 Thor, 439 U.S. at 532. (quoting Lucas V. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449
(1930)).
322 See Thor, 439 U.S. at 532.
323 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
324 Thor, 439 U.S. at 533.
325 See id.
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Despite the nearly insurmountable task of overcoming the burden of proof
on the taxpayer and the strict standard of review affording considerable deference
to the Commissioner, the taxpayer has won in some instances, albeit very few. In
order to fully understand the abuse of discretion standard, it is important to look to
a few cases and why the courts have found an abuse of discretion by the
Commissioner. In the cases where the taxpayer has won, the facts are very
important to the court's decision that the Commissioner abused his power.326 The
judgment of abuse of discretion is based in part on the same factual circumstances
the Commissioner uses to see if a taxpayer has clearly reflected his income.327 The
Commissioner judges the taxpayer based on the facts, and the courts judge the
Commissioner based on those same facts. Therefore, the Commissioner must have
incorrectly determined that the taxpayer failed to clearly reflect his income as a
prerequisite to the determination that the Commissioner abused his power.328 The
Commissioner must then be found to have no rational basis in fact for his incorrect
determination in order to have abused his discretion.329 Therefore, a two level
analysis is used to illustrate the abuse of discretion standard of review.
In the case Van Pickerill & Sons, Inc. v. United States,330 a taxpayer used
a method of accounting for inventories that the Commissioner determined was not
clearly reflective of income.331 Van Pickerill, a wholesale distributor of liquor,
would purchase whiskey and have it aged it for approximately four years by the
seller before it would engage in bottling and selling the whiskey.332 The seller
would charge the taxpayer/distributor a monthly fee for storing and aging the
whiskey, but the taxpayer would not pay the fees until the end of the four-year aging
period.333 The taxpayer/distributor expensed these costs yearly, along with
insurance fees and some state taxes the seller charged to the taxpayer. 34 The
Commissioner argued that these expenses should not have been deducted yearly and
instead should have been capitalized into cost of goods sold and matched against
sales receipts at the time of sale.335
326 See generally Allegra, supra note 225 at 473-84.
327 See Rosow, supra note 135 at 1227-28.
328 See Allegra, supra note 225 at 481-82.
329 See id.
330 445 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1971).
331 Id. at 920.
332 Id. at 919.
333 Id. at 919-20.
334 Id. at 920.
335
Id.
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In coming to its decision, the Seventh Circuit noted that throughout the
industry this expensing was practiced by a great majority of distributors.33 6 The
Court also noted that the Service approved of the taxpayer's method in previous
audits of the taxpayer.337 Further, the Court stated that the tax liability for the
taxpayer would only minimally be affected, so matching principles were not
violated.338 In finding that the Commissioner abused its discretion, the Court
concluded that based on the facts the District Court's finding that the taxpayer did
clearly reflect income was not clearly erroneous .339 The Court concluded by stating:
"Thus it appears that the decision by the Commissioner is more an expression of
preference for capitalizing these charges rather than a determination that taxpayer's
consistent use of its methods will not reasonably reflect income in the long run. 3 °
The Court implicitly stated it will generally not uphold a mere preference by the
Commissioner as being a rational basis for his determination. 341' Therefore, the
finding of an abuse of discretion was based both on the fact that the taxpayer did
clearly reflect his income, and on the fact that the Commissioner had no rational
basis for his determination that the taxpayer did not clearly reflect his income.342
In the case of Ansley-Sheppard-Burgess Co. v. Commissioner,343 the Tax
Court also stated that it would not uphold the Commissioner's determination based
on a preference in methods of accounting. 344 The taxpayer in this case was a
construction contractor who used the cash method of accounting, as many other
construction contractors in his industry did.345 The Commissioner argued that the
cash method did not clearly reflect the taxpayer's income. 346 The Commissioner
also argued that the taxpayer in order to clearly reflect his income must use the
percentage of completion method.347
The Tax Court reiterated that in order to be upheld, the Commissioner must
have a rational basis for the change in methods, and the taxpayer must not clearly
336 Van Pickerill, 445 F.2d at 921.
337 id.
338 Id.
339 id.
3Q Id. at 921. (citing Klein Chocolate Co. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 142, 146 (1961)).
341 Van Pickerill, 445 F.2d at 921.
342 See id. at 921-22.
343 104 T.C. 367 (1995).
3
"4 Id. at 371.
34 Id. at 375.
346 Id. at 367.
347 id.
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reflect his income with the method he currently uses.348 The Tax Court, in coming
to its conclusion that the Commissioner abused his discretion, stated:
Although the Commissioner's determination that
a taxpayer's method of accounting does not
clearly reflect its income is given great deference
by this court, we have held that the Commissioner
cannot require a taxpayer to change from an
accounting method which clearly reflects its
income to an alternate method of accounting
merely because the Commissioner considers the
alternate method to more clearly reflect the
taxpayer's income.349
The Tax Court, in finding an abuse of discretion, held that this preference for one
method over another does not have an "adequate basis in law for the
Commissioner's conclusion."35 Once again, the courts have found for the taxpayer
not only because the taxpayer clearly reflected his income, but also because a
preference for another method does not equate to a rational basis for the change. 1
Another example of the taxpayer proving the abuse of discretion by the
Commissioner is in RLC Industries Co. v. Commissioner.52 Much like in the two
previous cases, the taxpayer used a method in conformity with G.A.A.P. and
industry practice, and was consistently applied, yet the Commissioner found that the
method did not clearly reflect income. 3 The Tax Court stated that fiscal concerns,
much like a mere preference in the previous cases, was not a rational basis for a
determination that the taxpayer did not clearly reflect income.354 The Tax Court
reasoned:
Respondent argues that the method that she
determined would more clearly reflect income.
Respondent's focus is upon the disparity between
the method she determined and the one used by
petitioner. That focus, in the setting of this case,
348 Ansley-Sheppard-Burgess, 104 T.C. at 371.
319 Id. at 371 (citing Molsen v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 485, 498 (1985)).350 Id. at 371-77.
351 id.
352 98 T.C. 457 (1992), aff'd, 58 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 1995).
133 Id. at 477, 502.
354 Id. at 502.
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is an insufficient reason for the imposition of a
differing method determined by respondent. The
best method is not necessarily the one which
produces the most tax in a particular year. If, as
here, a taxpayer's method is consistently applied
and clearly reflects income, we will not sustain
respondent's determination merely because it
produces more income tax for the taxable year
under consideration.355
The Court thus articulates another instance where the Commissioner's preference
for a change in method without more will be found to be an abuse of discretion.356
In some cases, courts have disagreed on the judgment as to whether or not
an abuse has taken place. For example, in RCA Corporation v. United States, 357 the
Second Circuit stated that the District Court was wrong in holding that the
Commissioner abused his power because the Circuit Court found an adequate basis
for the Commissioner's determination. 358 The Second Circuit further took a more
deferential approach that allowed it to uphold the Commissioner's conclusion,
"even if it does not agree with them [the Commissioner's determinations] .35' The
Supreme Court has run into difficulties as well. In American Automobile
Association v. United States,36 ° the Court entered a decision with four dissenters
upholding the determination of the Commissioner. 36' The dissenters stated in their
opinion that the accounting method did clearly reflect income and thus the
Commissioner's interference was unwarranted. 362 The Eleventh Circuit summed up
such a problem nicely by stating: "Of course, in deciding whether the
Commissioner has abused his discretion, we immediately face an age-old
philosopher's dilemma: how can we mere mortals know who sees the truth most
355 Id.
356 Id.
35' 499 F.Supp. 507 (S.D. N.Y. 1980), rev'd 664 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1981).
358 RCA, 664 F.2d at 886. See also- Allegra, supra note 225 at 481-83 (addressing the
criticism the Second Circuit has received about its refusal to determine whether the taxpayer
did in fact clearly reflect his income).
359 Allegra, supra note 225 at 482.
360 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
361 Id. at 697-98.
362 id. at 711-12.
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vividly?, 363 Thus, those sitting in judgment do not always come to the same
conclusion and do not always agree as to what constitutes an abuse of discretion.6
The abuse of discretion standard in tax cases places the burdenof proof
solely on the taxpayer to prove that the Commissioner has abused his discretion.
The burden of proof also will not shift to the Commissioner to justify his
determinations upon the showing of any independent facts. Thus, the taxpayer has
a heavy burden when it brings suit against the Commissioner for a refund in a clear
reflection of income case. The courts have an equally large hurdle in deciding
abuse of discretion cases because they are limited in the scope of their review. The
review encompasses a twofold inquiry. First, the court looks to see if the taxpayer
has clearly reflected his income using the same facts and circumstances the
Commissioner used to make his determination. Second, if the court finds that the
method was a clear reflection of the taxpayer's income, then the court must look to
see if there was a rational basis for the Commissioner's decision. As we have seen,
the courts will not uphold a mere preference for a different method or a generation
of a greater tax liability to the taxpayer as a rational basis for finding that there is
no clear reflection of income by the taxpayer. Finally, the courts disagree as to
whether an abuse of discretion has taken place due to differing views on the role the
court should play in review, and because the courts sometimes define a rational
basis differently.
V. THE CASE FOR A LESSER STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. A Lesser Standard is Warranted
The rule of law mandates a system where the written law predominates over
the discretion of individuals.365 However, discretion is an indispensable component
to any workable system of laws. 366 Thus, the balance between the rule of law and
the rule of man must be kept in mind during this inquiry into whether rule of law
principles have been impermissibly violated through the workings of §446. The
rule of law mandates a system that treats taxpayers equally.367 Finally, the rule of
law requires the separation of powers as understood by the checks and balances
theorists and encompasses the essential concept of judicial review.368
363 Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 743 F.2d 781, 788 (1 1h Cir. 1984).
364 See id.
365 Epstein, supra note 8 at 151.
366 ARISTOTLE, supra note 2.
367 See Epstein, supra note 8 at 151.
368 See Sargentich, supra note 71 at 442-44 (addressing the position that courts should not
intervene in separation of powers issues).
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Generally, there is some disagreement as to what amounts to a rule of law
violation.369 Some clues as to the existence of a rule of law violation can be gleaned
from the results of the workings of the system of law. The resulting problems that
occur when the rule of law is overly compromised include the uncertainty in results
from the application of the law, and the inability of the governed to rely on and plan
their activities in accordance with the law.370 Further, with the analysis of an anti-
abuse rule we must also look for cases where the Service has tried to override legal
precedence, and/or interfere with legitimate taxpayer transactions. 7 Rule of law
violations can also be seen when similarly situated taxpayers within the same
industry are treated differently by the legal system. 372 An inconsistency in the
results betweenjurisdictions is also a problem that becomes more frequent when the
rule of law has been compromised.373 Finally, we must look to see if the Service has
usurped too much legislative and judicial powers by escaping judicial review.374 All
of these problems exist with §446(b), and will be analyzed in the order of Dicey's
three facets of the rule of law.
The predominance of written law over discretion means that the rule of law
trumps the rule of man.375 Under §446(b), the rule of man is in full force. The
Secretary is given statutory power to decide whether a taxpayer has clearly reflected
his income. 37' Thus, the discretion of an individual takes precedence over a system
of written guidance to the taxpayer. Further, given the reluctance of the courts to
question determinations of the Commissioner, this opinion is many times
controlling on the issue of taxpayer treatment. This type of system fosters
uncertainty and an inability to rely by the taxpayer because the determinations made
are the product of an individual's value judgment.377
As Hayek stated, the rule of law requires that the rules be fixed and known
beforehand. 378 Thus, the rule of law value that taxpayers have the ability to
organize their affairs according to the law is lost because individual judgement is
subjective. This resulting uncertainty also erodes the taxpayer's confidence in the
369 Fallon, supra note 5 at 5.
370 Id. at 7-8.
371 See Rosow, supra note 135 at 1245.372 See HAYEK, supra note 26 at 74.
373 See id.
374 See supra Section II.B.2.
37' Epstein, supra note 8 at 151.
376 §446(b).
371 See Segall, supra note 63 at 992-93.
378 See Epstein, supra note 8 at 151 (quoting Hayek, supra note 26 at 74).
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system in which he participates. 379 This loss of confidence, the can't win mentality,
can lead to more taxpayers playing the audit lottery.38° If the taxpayer does not
know the correct way to structure his affairs then he will structure them in the
manner that best suits himself because the perception is that no matter which way
he structures the transaction, he may be subject to liability. Thus, the loss of
certainty and resulting loss in confidence and ability to rely can lead to less overall
compliance with the laws.
The Van Pickerill & Sons case was an instance where the taxpayer engaged
in a legitimate expensing of items that has clearly been allowed for a long period
of time and the Service interfered.38 One of the results that occurs when the rule
of law has been overly compromised in the context of an anti-abuse rule is the
interference of the Service in legitimate taxpayer practices.382 In the Van Pickerill
& Sons case, the Service had even "itself consistently approved this method of
accounting in its audits of taxpayer. 38 3 Thus, not only was the Service interfering
with a legitimate taxpayer practice but it was contradicting its prior judgments.
This action by the Service is inconsistent with the principles of the rule of law and
a direct result of the Service being granted too much discretion without review.
Furthermore, in the context of anti-abuse rules, the Service sometimes will
try to override set legal precedence. 384 In the Ansley-Sheppard-Burgess Co. v.
Commissioner 5 case, the Commissioner tried to override the use of the cash
method by the construction company taxpayer.38 6 If the Court were to follow the
Commissioner's arguments in the case, the result would essentially be to "prohibit
the cash method of accounting for tax purposes. 38 7 The Court refused the
Commissioner's arguments and acknowledged the effort to override the
acceptability of the cash method as inconsistent.388 "The cash method of accounting
has been widely used throughout the contracting industry and accepted by the
respondent since time immemorial. 38 9 The Service was plainly trying to override
379 See Rosow, supra note 122 at 529-30.310 Id. at 497.
381 Van Pickerili & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 918 71h Cir. 1971).
382 Rosow, supra note 135 at 1245.
383 Van Pickerill, 445 F.2d at 921.
384 See Ansley-Sheppard-Burgess Co. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 367, 372-75 (1995).
385 Id.
386 Id. at 367-68.
387 Id. at 374 (quoting RLC Indus. Co. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 457, 493 (1992)).
388 Id. at 375.
389 id.
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the long-standing precedent that the cash method clearly reflects income.39 ° Such
arguments are a clear case where the Commissioner has tried to overuse his
discretion in contravention of the rule of law.
The reduction in taxpayer certainty and ability to rely on the tax system is
a direct result of the unquestioned discretion given to the Commissioner. Taxpayers
are faced with a situation where the singular judgment of the staff at the Service
will govern their affairs. Taken to its logical conclusion, this system is the essence
of the rule of man because legal determinations become wholly subjective
judgments, with no protection from the rule of law to keep such subjectivity in
check. Furthermore, instances such as Van Pickerill & Sons and Ansley-Sheppard-
Burgess show how the Service has the potential to overuse its discretion. This
nearly unreviewable and nearly unbridled treatment of the citizenry by the Service
under §446 runs afoul of Dicey and Hayek's first and possibly most essential
mandate of the rule of law.
The rule of law's second main principle is the equality of treatment of
taxpayers in the same situations, and the subjugation of all taxpayers to the same
law. In our legal system, for the most part all citizens are subject to the Internal
Revenue Code and are taxpayers."' Thus, the violation of the rule of law's second
main principle comes from the unequal treatment of similarly situated taxpayers.
For example, in the case of Van Pickerill & Sons v. United States,392 the taxpayer
expensed a monthly service fee for the storage and aging of liquor and was
challenged by the Service for not clearly reflecting income.393 The Seventh Circuit
noted that the practices used by the taxpayer were the same as those used by a
majority of the other taxpayers in the same industry.9 Which begs the question of
why Van Pickerill & Sons was forced to litigate the case, when no other taxpayers
in the same industry were forced to?395 Van Pickerill & Sons was forced to
shoulder the burden of expensive litigation when others similarly situated were not.
This is unequal treatment, and it violates the rule of law.
390 Note that the text of § 446 itself specifically authorizes the cash method of accounting.
See § 446.
391 Note limited exceptions do exist such as nonprofit corporations, however such entities
are still subject to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code even if they do not pay taxes
to the government.
392 445 F.2d 918 (7t' Cir. 1971).
391 Id. at 919-20.
394 Id. at 921.
195 Note that as long as there is a tax code, some taxpayers will be forced to litigate new or
novel positions. However, in this case a long-standing unchallenged practice was
questioned as a direct result of the overuse of discretion by the Service.
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Unequal treatment is also evident with the inconsistency of results between
different jurisdictions. For example in the Second Circuit decision of RCA
Corporation v. United States,396 the Court decided that it was prohibited through its
abuse of discretion standard of review from reviewing the Commissioner's
substantive determination."' Yet in other cases the courts readily review the
substantive determination as a first step in order to judge whether an abuse of
discretion has taken place.398 Thus, many other taxpayers have had the ability to
have erroneous determinations of the Commissioner at least reviewed and
sometimes overturned, yet RCA was given no such opportunity. 399 This unequal
procedural treatment under the application of §446 runs afoul of the rule of law.
The rule of law also mandates that the separation of powers must be
maintained with a system of checks and balances and judicial review., °°
Administrative agencies pose an insurmountable violation of separation of powers
unless one subscribes to the checks and balances theory.40 ' However, even under
the checks and balances theory, difficulties arise when an administrative agency
oversteps its executive bounds to excess. °2 The Service is a prime example of such
an overstepping of bounds. The Service is delegated the law-making power by
Congress under §446, not only with its ability to issue regulations but also with the
conferred discretion by which the agency can make determinations. Thus, the
Service has the delegated power to state the law, to enforce the law, and due to an
effective lack of judicial review, the power to decide specific instances of
compliance or noncompliance under the law. Such a concentration of all three
governmental powers into one agency is a violation of separation of powers and the
rule of law. 43
Even under the conflicts of interest theory of separation of powers, a
problem exists with the Service's role in the operation of §446. The Service has the
primary function of administering the tax laws in order to bring revenue into the
government, and also has the power to determine when a taxpayer has not paid
enough taxes to the government under §446. Thus, the system functions in a
... 664 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1981).397 Id. at 886.
398RCA Corp. v. United States, 499 F.Supp. 507 (S.D. N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 881 (2d
Cir. 1981). See also Van Pickerill & Sons v. United States, 445 F.2d 918 (7"' Cir. 1971);
Ansley-Sheppard-Burgess Co. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 367 (1995).
'99 RCA, 664 F.2d at 886.
4m See Medina, supra note 72 at 1554-55.
401 See Segall, supra note 63 at 1013-14
40' See Sargentich, supra note 71 at 440-41.
403 THE FEDERALIST No. 47 at 245-46 (James Madison)(Max Beloff ed., 1987).
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manner that allows the agency to bring a complaint against a taxpayer for not
conforming to the rules it has promulgated itself. Then the agency, which has the
motive to bring funds into the government, has the power to determine whether the
taxpayer has conformed to the rules. Analogously, the operation of §446 is like a
system that allows the plaintiff in an adversarial dispute to have the power to
adjudicate the case which he has brought. Because the Service has a vested interest
in the adjudication of tax disputes, it cannot be allowed to have the power of
adjudication as well because a conflict of interest arises. To allow §446 to operate
in this manner is to violate separation of powers and the rule of law.
Far be it for this author or any other to state that Aristotle is incorrect and
argue for an elimination of discretion from the system of taxation. In fact anti-
abuse rules such as the general clear reflection of income provision contained in
§446(b) are necessary for the Service to combat taxpayer abuses. However, the
workings of §446 must place a limit as to how much discretion can be tolerated and
still be in conformity with rule of law. The general discretion-conferring provision
of §446(b) grants considerable power to the Service to audit taxpayers based upon
no guidelines save its opinion that the taxpayer has not clearly reflected his income
with his current accounting method. This opinion and ability to judge is tainted by
the Service's conflicting interest of bringing revenue into the government. Further,
when this discretionary power is combined with such a deferential standard of
review as the abuse of discretion standard, it oversteps the bounds of what the rule
of law will tolerate. Undeniably, the rule of law requires a change in the operation
of §446.
The elimination of §446's anti-abuse rule, the Service's strongest weapon
for combating taxpayer abuses in this area, is not an option for remedying the
centralized power problem. Even just statutorily restraining the Service's
discretionary power will only serve to strip the Service of its ability to fight novel
taxpayer abuses. Reliance upon retroactivity, either by Congress or the Service, as
a means of adding discretion after eliminating the discretion under §446 is also not
a viable option from a rule of law standpoint. Finally, adding to the problem of
hyperlexis by legislating more rules into §446 or its regulations is also not a viable
solution. Although some would argue legislating is the best option for restoring
rule of law principles, enacting more rules that are easily circumventable will only
lead to taxpayer abuse of the rules that the discretionary provision was meant to
prevent. The enactment of more rules to give the taxpayer guidance about what
accounting methods are acceptable, and/or a corresponding decline in the discretion
granted to the Service, will not restore rule of law principles, but will instead create
more difficult problems and exacerbate the current situation. Thus, the §446
discretion-conferring clear reflection of income anti-abuse rule should be left as it
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is, and the Treasury should not promulgate more rules in order to give the taxpayer
guidance.
The solution that would best minimize the current problems stemming from
the operation of §446 is to remove the abuse of discretion standard of review from
§446 cases, and to replace it with the clearly erroneous standard of review. This
action would return power to the judiciary that has been taken by the Service under
the operation of §446. This solution does not enact more rules that are easy to
manipulate, and does not cripple the Service by ripping away its discretion to
question taxpayers. The solution can be implemented relatively easily, either by
congressional enactment as an amendment to §446 or as an adoption of a new
standard by the court system. Either way it is accomplished, a change from the
abuse of discretion standard of review to the clearly erroneous standard of review
is an easily implemented and feasible solution to the troubling rule of law problems
inherent in the operation of §446.
B. The Clearly Erroneous Standard
In other tax litigation, the Service is not given so much deference that it will
not be overturned if clearly wrong as is true under the abuse of discretion
standard.4°4 Generally, the Service is given a presumption of correctness, 5 but is
not given the ability to be wrong and have such substantive decisions avoid review
by a court with proper jurisdiction. 0 6 The workings of the anti-abuse rule of §446
and the abuse of discretion standard together give the Service more power than the
Service is traditionally granted. Furthermore, in the case of §446 the Service is
granted more power than is justifiable.
The clearly erroneous standard of review is incorporated directly by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Rule 52(a), although it does not appear in the
A.P.A °7 The Rule states:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
404 See PAULA M. JUNGHANS & JOYCE K. BECKER, FEDERAL TAX LITIGATION 18.02[ 1] (2d
ed. 1992).405 id.
406 Rosenburg, supra note 296 at 649 (discussing the discretion granted a trial judge).
407 Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a), and 5 U.S.C. §, supra note 261.
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given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge
of the credibility of the witnesses. °8
Thus, the standard of review allows the Service to have the power to make a
determination as to whether the taxpayer's method of accounting clearly reflects
income under §446(b). But the standard would allow the reviewing court to assess
the determination and override the substantive decision if it clearly is incorrect.
The Supreme Court in analyzing the clearly erroneous standard stated that
this standard is not a de novo standard to decide factual issues. 40 9 Instead, the
function of a reviewing court in a clearly erroneous standard must look to the
primary determination as to the facts and accept them as correct unless clear
evidence suggests otherwise 410 As stated by the court:
The clearly erroneous standard plainly does not
entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of
the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that
it would have decided the case differently. The
reviewing court oversteps the bounds of its duty
... if it undertakes to duplicate the role of the
lower court ... Where there are two permissible
views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice
between them cannot be clearly erroneous.41
Thus, if a clearly erroneous standard of review is instituted, a reviewing court
cannot substitute in its own judgement for that of the Commissioner in §446 cases.
However if the Commissioner is clearly wrong as to his determination, then the
court is empowered to intervene and correct the error.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF A LESSER STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Curing Problems - Advantages to the Clearly Erroneous Standard
The greatest advantage to instituting the clearly erroneous standard of
review from the standpoint of the government would be the return to respecting
separation of powers principles, without eliminating the Service's flexibility to
408 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
409 See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
410 Id.
411 Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985).
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challenge taxpayer actions. Although strict separation is not possible, the
heightened review of the Service's determinations will strengthen the judiciary's
role in the system of taxation. This will remove some of the adjudicatory power
that the Service has acquired through §446, and limit the Service to a role of
delegated legislating and administration of the tax laws.412 The rule of law problem
of concentrated power inherent with the use of administrative agencies, and the
Service in particular in this case, can be curbed somewhat by the increased role of
thejudiciary. Therefore, the principles of separation of powers will be strengthened
through the protection of judicial review over agency determinations, and the rule
of law will again be placed in a more comfortable balance with the rule of man.
Another advantage to changing to the clearly erroneous standard of review
will be the self-policing that the Service will place upon itself. If the Service knows
that its determinations are subject to reversal if they are incorrect, it will be less
likely to question legitimate taxpayer actions. The Service's limited resources
would not permit challenges that will ultimately end in failure to sustain a
deficiency. Thus, the Service will use its resources more efficiently in auditing and
assessing deficiencies on those taxpayers that are truly not reflecting their income
properly. Those taxpayers who are circumventing the system will be assessed to
pay their share correctly. Therefore, the change in standard will lead to efficient
and accurate Service assessments.
Another benefit to the government will be the ability to more effectively
promote policy goals through tax legislation. Having a system that promotes
taxpayer reliance on guidance facilitates the workings of incentives in the Code.
Due to the certainty that will result from an increased judicial review, taxpayers will
be able to rely on the Code and govern their affairs based on it more readily and
more often. Thus, the achievement of policy goals through incentive legislation will
be more easily and efficiently accomplished.
The court system will also benefit from the change in the standard of
review. Having the clearly erroneous standard will alleviate some of the
disagreement as to the court's role in deciding §446 cases. As the standard is now,
courts disagree as to whether they are allowed to inquire into the substantive issues
of a §446 case, and due to such a disagreement similarly situated taxpayers are
412 Note that the A.P.A.'s intention in instituting the abuse of discretion standard of judicial
review was not to grant such an enormous amount of power to administrative agencies, but
was intended to simply reiterate the common concept of judicial review. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 263, at 9. Thus, the operation of section 446 contravenes the intent
behind section 706 of the A.P.A., and a change in the standard of review would put a stop
to the misconstruction of section 706 in clear reflection of income cases.
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treated differently. If the clearly erroneous standard is implemented the courts will
all know that substantive inquiries as well as reversals of the Commissioner's
findings are within the proper dominion of the courts. Thus, the disparity in
procedural treatment of taxpayers will be lessened, and the disagreement between
courts will be lessened.413
The greatest benefit to the individual taxpayer from changing the standard
of review is the increased fairness that will result from a shift back to rule of law
and away from the rule of man. The taxpayer will benefit from the reduction of
Service interference in situations where the taxpayer has behaved correctly. As
stated previously, the Service will have to manage its affairs more efficiently and
will avoid challenging taxpayers that are operating within the bounds of precedence.
Thus, the taxpayer will once again be able to rely on tax guidance without the
justifiable fear that even if they comply with all precedents and standards they will
be found noncompliant under §446.
Returning to a system that has judicial review and treats the taxpayer in a
more just and fair manner will consequently have beneficial effects on the
government. Increases in taxpayer reliance and confidence in the system may help
to eliminate the poor image that plagues the Service because it will no longer be
seen as an agency that oversteps its authority and burdens innocent taxpayers.
Changing the standard of review will also lead to courts being viewed as the
guardian of taxpayer rights again, rather than as the Commissioner's rubber stamp
for his determinations. Increasing the legitimacy of the government's institutions
with taxpayers by promoting fairness and judicial review strengthens the rule of law
and benefits the taxpayer.
Although this list is not exhaustive, several of the largest advantages of
changing the standard of review in §446 cases are stated. First, the burden of
taxation will be shifted back to the taxpayers who should shoulder it, leading to the
more fair treatment of taxpayers. This fair treatment will result in greater reliance
on and compliance with the Code. Second, the Service will be forced to use its
resources more effectively and efficiently. Third, policy goals will be easier to
achieve through incentive legislation due to increased taxpayer reliance and
compliance. Fourth, the court system will see a reduction in the disparity of
taxpayer treatment and have less disagreement within itself because of unclear role
of courts operating under the abuse of discretion standard. Fifth, the reputation and
43 Note that complete elimination of all discrepancies is impossible. As long as there is
more than one way to define a term such as "error," there will always be some
disagreements as to what actions amount to an error.
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legitimacy of the Service and the courts will improve as they take on their more
traditional functions and perform them better. Finally, the separation of powers
doctrine will be bolstered by returning power to the judicial branch from the
executive. Overall, all the three requirements of the rule of law would be better met
by the operation of §446 if the standard of review is changed from the abuse of
discretion standard to the clearly erroneous standard.
B. Causing Problems - Disadvantages to the Clearly Erroneous Standard
One commonly cited problem with a change to a lesser standard of review
is that the Service and taxpayers may be forced to litigate cases more often.414
Taxpayers who formerly would have submitted to the Commissioner rather than go
through the hassle and expense of fighting his determination, may decide to bring
suit due to the fact that they will be granted substantive judicial review. The cost
of litigating a case is a difficult burden for the taxpayer to bear.415 Increased
litigation would also increase the costs of the Service in assessing deficiencies
because they will be forced to go to court over more claims. The case load on the
court system would also be increased, further adding to the government's costs.
This increase in litigation would correspondingly lead to an increase in the size of
the government, assuming adequate funding is appropriated. Thus, the result of a
change in the standard of review may be increased costs from litigation both for the
taxpayer and the Service.
However, with the new standard of review, the Service will be less likely
to get involved with cases that must be litigated. Instead, the Service will focus on
taxpayers who have unquestionable violations of the clear reflection principles and
will no longer target the boarder-line or legitimate taxpayers. Thus, rather than an
increase in litigation, the imposition of a clearer standard of review may help to
lessen the amount of tax litigation. Further, the clearer standard will promote-more
certainty about the court's role in tax litigation for the appellate courts, and may
decrease the need for reviewing cases because the lower court has misconstrued the
meaning of the abuse of discretion standard of review.
Another problem that can occur with the decrease in the standard of review
is a lessening of the amount of funding brought into the government. The burden
414 Note that an increase in litigation seems almost impossible when one looks to how many
clear reflection of income cases have come through the courts. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 446 (West
Supp. 1999) (case annotations).
415 Note: In fact, the cost to a taxpayer of litigating a case may well be more than the amount
of the deficiency judgment, which tends to be an incentive not to litigate.
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of decreased funding to the fisc can occur due to the fact that many taxpayers who
have been assessed and who previously may not have wished to pursue a claim for
a refund, may refuse to submit to the Commissioner's under the new standard.
Thus, the government will be deprived of that amount of taxes which it presently
collects. However, Congress can cure this problem through more legitimate ways
of bringing in funding. Legislating and budgeting for tax increases will more fairly
bring in tax revenue and bring it in from the sources that are legitimately targeted.
Targeted tax increases are a more fair way to fund the government, rather than
bringing in revenues from unfairly charged taxpayers who wish to avoid the
expense of litigation, especially when the courts refuse to overturn erroneous
decisions.
VII. CONCLUSION
After some scholars have finished their inquiry into the violations of the
rule of law by administrative agencies they have stated that our system may require
sweeping reforms in order to regain conformity to the rule of law.4 16 In the context
of §446, sweeping reforms are not necessary. Although the workings of §446(b)
have run afoul of the rule of law, and the problems from this deserve serious
consideration, the system only requires a push back in the right direction. Changing
the standard of review over the Service's determinations in clear reflection of
income cases reinstates meaningful judicial review. A power shift will result as
some of the adjudicatory power the Service now holds will be given back to the
judicial branch. The power shift will strengthen the separation of powers between
the branches and promote rule of law ideals. Therefore, a change from the abuse
of discretion standard to the clearly erroneous standard is a push along the
continuum from the rule of man back to the rule of law, where the operation of §446
ultimately belongs.
416 Fallon, supra note 5 at 4.
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